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There are severa l possible approaches to the task of comparing the 
thought of t wo thinkera. One is the grammatical method. In this method 
the conceived t ask is to lift out from the writings ot eaoh of the tvo 
men the conclusions whioh they reach on the general problem and on sub-
sidiary problems. For example, Thomas saysa "It is impossible to attain 
to the knowled6e of the 'l'rinity by natural reason.111 Augustine, on the 
other hand, enjoins us to "seek the Trinity which is God, in the things 
themselves t hat are eternal, incorporeal, and unehangeable. 112 We might 
oonclUde f rom these t ,10 passages that there is a basic and irreconcilable 
difference ill the two men ancl that our investigations have taught us 
aomethi ne r egarding the beliefs of the two men. But ve shall be mis-
taken, for a. more careful analysis itill reveal that the opposition is 
much more conplicated, f or the tvo men mean something different by 
"knowledge, " 1'e.ttain to," and by "reason." With these materials, then, 
there i s no ba.ois f or adequate eriticiam. 
A second t;vpe of investigation is the historical-peyeholog1cal type, 
in which the doctrines held by each are seen as oonsectuents ot hiator1cal 
1summa Theologioa, Q. 32, Art. l, .! Answer. I shall make all m7 
references to Thomas to the section of the article in which it is found. 
Unless otherwise indica ted, the reference will be to I, I of the Summa.. 
212!, Trinitate, Book 15. oh. 4, Par. 6. I shall make all references 
to this book i n this fashion. Unless otherwise stated, the reference 
will be to .Q2. Trinitate. 
2 
or psychol ogical conditioning. In thia t1])e, too, the doctrine of the 
two men are not evaluated. by 1>rincipl0e internal to the statements of 
the doctrines , but by a hi s torical principle, implied by a philosop~ ot 
history, or by a psychological principle (or principles), implie~ by a 
theory of psychol ogy. That such 1nveat1gat1ons are possible and valuable 
I concede, but only as illustrative or perhaps partial proof of the 
principl ~1s used in their interpretation, not as proviDB the oorrectneaa 
or error of the dootri nee. Such an inveatittation might see the SUlll11la 
aa the ~r oduc t of stolid monkishne8o and the 12!, Trinitate the result of 
a repentant renroba t e . Or one might see the J2!! Trinitate a.a the last 
~reat product of Neo-Pl a tonism and the~ ae the logical extension of 
arrogant ra.ti ona.lisn1, soon t o give way to a reaction. 
Tho third type of approach--that atte!llpted in this thesis--is in 
terms of th8 s truc t ure of thought in each man. An assUJ11:9 tion 1a made 
that notions of bei ng a nd of kno~ledge and the peculiar! ty of the :formu-
lation of t he probl em are determinative of the statement of the theo-
logical doctri ne. If s o. then an:, investigation which is interested 
primarily in t he content of the -doctrines must investigate these three 
determi nants. This thesis will be concerned with the philosophical 
determinants of the sta t ement of the doctrine of God in Aci.uinaa and 
AU&Ustine. The conrparison is then not between differing conclusions 
regarding similar problems, nor between different men, but between the 
documento themselves and tho structure of thought within each. 
Most basically this thesis is concerned vith the problem of schism. 
It attempts to discover the nature of the ovoosition between two theolo-
Biee. Schisms b-3sed on statements interpreted ~aamaticall7 are 
-
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tragically naivo. on personalities idolatrous. It is theology and the , 
practical nonsequencea of theology which alone can Justify schism •. .Arl4 
to discover the Op!)Osition between theologie.s requires an analysis of the 
basis of the statement of tha.t theology. 
I ha.ve chose n 'l'horna.s Aquinas and St. Augustine becarlSe fror.i the 
point cf vie"' which T. have taken they represent the primary divergence 
in y hilooophica l s t a tement of theology. Wh&t I mean by this should become 
clear in C.b.ap te~ Tv.o. At this point let me say simply that they are as 
oppoGi t e a~ t heologies can become. 
•rrm M?;TAPET'JIOS OF THEOLOG'T 
Defore I can discuss the metaphyaice or the doctrines of God in 
A'UgUStina and .Aquina s l must state the relation between metaph)'aios and 
theology. Thia wil l i nvolve a definition ot metap~sics, and thia deti-
ni tion will :fi x wh1:t.t I meau by the term "metapl)1'a1cal baeis." My problem 
1a to di ccover t he metaphyGieaJ. basea in the etatementa of the doctrine 
of God. Once di scovered, I will seek to formulate the relations between 
these metaphyoic.tl. bases, t1hich will take the form of propo&itiona. My-
theais i o t hat these t~o metaphysical bases do not contradict each other. 
but r r..ther that thoy a re neutral and equally yossible ways of stating 
the S9l.Ile 11 tr,ith. tt What I mean by this should become clear as I demon-
strate tha thesis . 
Ti,.ro pr.:>cedures are possible, the analytic and the synthetic. I 
could have s t arted t1i th the doctrines ot God, then elicited the meta-
ph791cs lrom each one, then compared them. 1hie, because of its vague 
similarity to t he so-called modern eoientifio method, might be regarded 
as prefer able . But t here is a second posaible procedure which baa the 
advantage of cla rity, pr ecision, and breTity, and which I shall there-
tore chooae. Prom pi•opositiona which cannot be ques\ioned I shall shov 
a priori the possible courses which metaphyaioe can toke, then show in 
vhioh the doctrines of God 1n Augustine and Aquinas are aet. I shall 
then diaouaa the relations between the two doctrines ot God. 
Meta:phyeic·a is the study of exiatenoe and eaaence. Thia is the 
s 
definition I choose to e ive to it. The definition does co-inc14e with 
all the primar y works l abeled "meta:ph7&ica" that I have read. It also 
applies t o l a r Ge oectione of the books and essays ordinarily regarded as 
epistemology. It f urther inolUdea sections .in books on mathematics 
(Russell, Princinl es .2.t Mathematics), tbeolo~ (Tillich, Paul, S7!tematic 
Theology !), political philosophy (Hobbes, Leviathan), ethics (Moore, 
G. E., Princ b>ia J~thica.), :physics (Whitehead, Science !!!d ,lh! Modern 
Worl~), and. me.ny other s. The definition is equivalent to euch other 
common def i nitions as II the basic prinoiplee of realit1, n einoe all baaic 
principl es of r eal i t y must i nvolve both existence and eesence, "the 
elementa l s tructure oi the universe," "being qua being, 11 etc. 
The onl y ca t egory which could be higher than these is bein&, if 
being i s defined ao the totality of existence and essence. But once we 
have said t hat i t i s this totality, we have finished vith it, and muat 
nov turn our a ttention to existence and essence. Nov there are two 
possible r el a tions that existence and essence can have to eaoh other. 
Et ther essence precedes existence, or exlstep.ce precedes essence. 137 
"precedes» I mean t hat either existence is reified essence, or essence 
is abstracted f r om existence. There are seTeral other ways of stating 
this same thought which may help elucidate. Essence is being is poas1-
b111ty is form is re~t. Exiatence is becoming is actuality is matter 
ia motion. This i s only generally true. It is true for aome philoso-
phers, but not for all. One may say that becoming includes being vi th 
Whitehead or that being include& becoming with Plato. Or that possibility 
inclUdea actuality ·with Leibnis or that within actuality we find the 
poaaible with Hume. Or that we find form in matter vith .Aristotle or 
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that form precedes matter with Kant. Or that all things in motion seek 
fulfillment i n r eat as in Aquinas, or that reat 1• change of motion, as 
in modern physi cs o All of these are analogous va79 of etatiJJg the same 
problem. They are the basic metaphJsical questions, and phlloaophera 
me.~ be divided according t o which of the positions they take. Within 
each decision ther e are other deoisio~a and within thoee deciaions nev 
deciaionso whi ch acc ounto f or the multiplicity of approaches to the baaic 
meta!)hysica l :prolllems. ,11th ea.ch decision, however, (and this ia impor-
tant f or t he thcs i e)~ the poesibilitiaa are delimited.. And the metapbr-
sica becomeo s e t . Content ~oured into the meta~hJaica, auoh as doctrines 
of God, h.e.rdene i nt o a det inite mold. ~he problem as to whether there 
is a distinc tion bet ween cont ent and form, or vhether one mereea into 
the other , i u i t sel i dependent upon a basic metaphysical decision. 
No , my b~sic aneorti on i s l either essence precedes existence or 
existence preceues es sence. This proposition 1s tautological, therefore 
a priori and therefor e true. The only other possibility is that they be 
contemporaneous . nut no possible meaning oa.n be found it. they be re-
garded as contemporaneous; such a supposition is therefore absurd. 
How can one decide bet\feen them1 There are two possible ways. One 
can neeat e one side of the disJunction, proving that the other is true. 
But this would necessitate an extraneou.a principle, which would be some-
how prior to this proposition. :sut our proposition ia the moat baaic 
proposition, and therefore no prior principle can be found. Thia way 1a 
therefore fr1ti tleso. The other 'flay is to diecoYer a principle vhioh will 
affirm one side of the dieJ-anction. »ut tor the aame- reason no such 
1 0---~• and therefore principle can be found. Therefore thia vay too • un• w.iu., 
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this is no $Olution to the problem. There is no apriori choice. 
M~· solution is this. The 11 or11 is an inclusive "or, IC which mean.a 
that both sides could be true. l3ut they can be true under onl~ one con-
. dit1on, t hat their truth is in terms of their capo,bilit7 for aorving aB 
a metaphysical description of the universe rather than having some spe-
cially f e.vorecl touch with reality. If they are Judged acc: ordiD6 to their 
capability, t his mel;l.ns that they must be Judged a. posteriori. '.l'hat will 
it mean t o Justif y them a posteriori? It means tha.t ~e Judge them in 
two ways . We judge them, first, as a mathematical system, in terms of 
the consistency of their consequences. They must not involve themselves 
1'1. abourdi ties. They mu.st not be self-contradictory, nor must they have 
consequ.enceo which obviously do not accord with realit7. '!'he second 
Justif ica tion i s in terms of comprehensivenes•• Their consequences must 
involve all of r eality. If a :pnrt of real,ity is omitted, and this be-
comes plain, t hen the principle lacks comprehenaiveneae and must not be 
aaaerted as the basic principle of the universe. 
Now it i s possible that one side of the diaJunction will stand the 
teat and not the other. But it ia also possible that both sides of the 
diaJunction will stand it. One can discover this onlf by a thorough 
et\ldy of meta~hysical systems. To Justif7 it oompletel.7 would require 
an eternity, But my reading up to this time is a partial Justification 
ot the thesis to me. This thesis itself will ser't'e as part of the proof. 
I contend tha t unless one or the other side or the proposition can be 
proved apOdictally ±'alee or self-contradictor,-, that we IIIUBt aasume that 
the two are both adequate description• of realit7, equall7 consistent 
and comprehensive, differin& only in the ways they slice tlle universe. 
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Thie meano that they will appear different in their formulation. 
At t his point I could :proceed. by ehoving the adequacy ot both in 
dealing with the same problems. But auoh demonstration would be infinite. 
I will therefor e attempt to use this principle in reference to the problem 
of the doctrines of God. My contention is that Aquinaa and Augustine 
take opposi te s ides on this metaph7aical question, the.t Aquinaa believe• 
existence pr ecedes essence and Augustine eeaence to precede existence. 
I shall attempt to show how the decision in each affects their doctrines 
ot' GOd. :Bef ore I go directly into the doctrines of God I find 1 t neces-
sary to describe some of the aecol'ldary metaph.7sical decisions of the tvo 
men. 
Exie tence precedes essence in Thomaa . Be aay1 in hie eoeay 29. 
Being and Es sence that form is the •actuality' of matter. fo4atter is 
potential. Fr om the ~otential the actual follova. 1 But there are 
difterent posoible war s of conceiving essence. Philosophers aa widel7 
different a s .Aristotle and Whitehead accept this -principle. Easences 
are either definitions or relations. They are either determinate things 
or determinat e r elations between thi~s. No third kind of essence is 
conceivable. These exhaust the poaaibilities. Thomae tindl his eaaence• 
in definitions of things. In !!!9£ !!!! tHence he eayal "T.aeence h 
what 1$ signi fied by the definition or the thinga.•2 EYery particular 
thing has an essence, which baa a definition in terma of a genua and a 
differentia. E. g., Socrates ie a man. Mania defined aa a rational 
1ot. St. Thomas Aquinas, 12.!, lDnte ·.u Eaaentia {Nev Tork& Appleton-
Century-Crofte, Inc., 19J7), P• 8. 
2 Ibi4. • P• 7. 
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anlmal in Aquinas. :But a.nima.l too has an easence, vhich in turn 1a 
defined. The essenceo therefore fall into a he1rarohy. Thia ia one 
possible wa y of ·,a·eatix:ig essences within existences. The only other 
way of doa.lin,g \1 i t h thi ngs is ae a congeries of rela.tiona. as in Vhite-
head. Since '<te are concerned with the doctrine of God, we have to con-
elder this :point yat . In wh9.t mode does essence exist in God in a schema 
auoh as t h i s? The essence of God cannot be a definition. since that 
would mean tnat God i a one of a genus of things. which is obviously false. 
God must be defined i n the hi~heot category of things, which is esaence 
and exis t ence . Since e:dstence is pri.:iary to essence in Thomas, the 
eaaence of God is Hi s existence and cannot be described in any other 
term~ but these.J I will treat of this in ~ore detail in later seotions. 
Aquinas t hou has made two metaphy8ical deoiBions. 11:dstence precedeo 
essence. The eosence of a thing is its definition. 
I must now undertake a. similar investigation in AU&U8tine. Here 
the opposite decision is made. In his essay~ the Free }!fil A-ugustine 
shows that all the truth and wisdom which wo find in the world, mutable 
and imperf cct
0 
have their source in an immutable and perfect God. Thie 
is the essence tha t precedes all existence. "ior if all thi~s which 
are, will ·be, provided no form has been taken avaY, then the bu11Utable 
form itself, by which all mutable thiuge subsist that the~ may be ful-
filled and governed by the numbers of their form,. is their providence; 
for thillo""S would not be, if it were not."4 Thie is the !irst decision, 
3ct. ~., P• 28. 
4selections from Medieyal Philoaophera, Richard P. 
(New Torka Charles Scribner's Sona, 1929), 1. 62. 
KoKeon, editor 
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and 1 ta meaning ,'1111 be further clarified as ve tind 1 t dneloped in aec-
tion 5. Essences are in t erma ot relations rathor than in det1a1\1ona 
0£ thil'1g1J. Thila is ev i de nt i n Aug1111tiu'l'o discuss ion o!' t lle analog1ea 
between numbar and truth. which are always dbouasions of relations. 
Such discussions are e:x:hibit od both in 2.!!, the F-rao li!,ll and in ~ !?!!, 
Trinit7 • 
• ~ u i naG does not uevl ec t r elations, h~,ever. No ~hilosopher could, 
aince t ho ralutione of ti1ne and r;pa.ct! , among others, are too obvious a 
part of our 0.xperience to neglect. And so easence ie attached not onl7 
to the gemie of oubGta.nca , but to the genera of quantity, quality, and 
the othoT eeven.5 But the l ~st nine ~enera e.re ~oeterior to the g enus 
of oubet ~nce . Or~e speeJ:::a ot th8&8 genere. only in rela tion to subatanoe. 
They aro a po.rt of n. ~mb1t o.neo. They are attached to substance &15 a 
genus (me.n io ~n an i mal) , ~ea property (man is gramm&tical. i.e., uses 
l&Ill.,rue.ge ) • P.~ an ace idont (!!Ian ha.a five f'i~ ers on each hand). 
I n A1J.gUstiM
0 
o il the othP.r he.nd, thern is no distinction between 
eubat anoe and t he other genere.. The relations o.re 1>rimar:,. and eu'bstances 
become conger ies of rel ations . Thi s can be found reflected in many parts 
of Au~sti na. The essay .Q.!! ~ Free :all le one of Auguotine tg attempts 
to £ind t he pr imary r el a tions of the universe; and in this essay ~e dis-
cover number. t r uth, ooauty, the good. 
This latte1· dis t i nction. the third thtit 1 h~ve rode, al:JO aff eota 
the doctrine of God. Just in what way ! shall discuss later in the 
thesis. 
Sot. .Aquinas, ]!. :i,:ntg .!! F.eeent1a, P• 4. 
-
CHAPTER III 
TW.1 PROBLBM OF TBl': EXISTF.llOE OF GOD 
Aquinas presents proofs for the existence ot God. The hiato17 ot 
the proofs for the existence of God, whether they are valid and how the7 
are valid, ia a metaphysical problem, for 11,!lOn baaic metayhyaical deo1-
aionti depend the validity of the proo!B, as vell as the meaning ot truth 
and k nowledge . The proofs in Aituinaa depend upon his first decision that 
existence precedes essence. If existence precedes essence, then it is 
the knowledge of existent t hings that precedes knovledge of e88encea. 
Human epio·~omol ogy begins with a noetioal grasp of the easencee of the 
universo ~nd then reasons from thes~. The eearoh for the knowledge of 
GOd muat, as everything else, begin with the first essences intuited by 
the mind. 11 'J~her efore I say that thie proposition, Q.24. exists, of itself 
is self-evident, f or the predicate is the same as the subJect, beoauae 
God 18 lUa own axis tenoe •••• Mow because we do not know the eaaence of 
God, the , roposition is not self-evident to us, but needs to be demon-
stra ted by things tha t are more known to us, tholJ8h leAs knovn in their 
na.ture--n1~ely, by His effeota. 111 
\ 
Theref ore Thonv~s's proofs are proof• which proceed from the effects 
to· the cause of these etfects. All of Thomaa•s arguments are basicall7 
argumento from the effect to tho cause, although they take five different 
forms. the argument from motion, from efficient cauoe, from possibillt7, 
1T'no ~asio ,ritin.ge of Thomas .Aguiga•, Anton Pegia, editor (Nev 
Yorks P.nndom Romrn, 1944). Q,. 3, .Art. 1, ! anawe3:. 
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from the gradation of quali tioa, and :f'rom the f'inal cauea.2 All of them 
depend upon the arguments f rom ca'USe which 1s tound in the eaaq .Qa 
Being .!S4, Sssence. 
Since existence pr ecedes essence, existence la separate from 
essences. Since exi s tence precedes essence, an eeaence cannot achieTe 
existence thr o~h itself, but must achieve it from another. But thie 
vould lee.d. to an i nfinite r egress, and therefore there l!fll8t be aoraeth1ng 
vhich i s self-oaused. And ~nly a being in vhich existence does not pre-
cede essence can be self-caused. Therefore there must be a being whose 
existence is his essence. And this being we call God.) 
Now the other proofs can be ~educed to the above proof. All effecte 
are motions, and no notions are not effects. Therefore there must be a 
self-moved mover. Similarly all possibles are possibles as effects, and 
all ei fec t s wer A once possibles. The gradation of qualitie1 is &1111!)17 
a particular k ind of el feot. So also final cause• are effects of etfi-
cient causes . 
Therefor e all of the proofs are variant• of one, and that one proof 
depends upon t he fir st two metaphysical decisions. Once Aquinas has made 
these decis1one
0 
a certain kind of proof for the exietence of God becomes 
poaeible. This constitute• the description ot the metap~ioal baiie 
for this segment of the doctrine of God. 
The proof f or the existence of God in A'2g'18tine takes a di!feren\ 
2 ~ 
Ibiq.., Q.. 2, Art. J, !answer. 
3st. Thomas Aquinaa, R!, !!!!!, !i ~aeenUa 
Oeutu:ry-Orofta. Inc •• 19J7) PP• 24 f. 
(New Torkl Appleton-
13 
form. It iR n proof which r eceived its claoeic treatment in DeaOartea 
with some differences ~nd is found repeated, with variationo, in platon-
izing philosophers throughout the history of thought. ~iat1ne waa 
committed t o this proof as soon an he made the metaphyoicnl decision that 
eaeence precedes existence. For if eaeence precedes existence, then 
there mus t be some ess ence ~hioh preoedea all of existence here on earth 
a.nd upon ,-:hich all of existence depends. All created things depend upon 
him for t hoir. existence, all true stntemsnts depend upon his truth, all 
beautiful t hings ~von hi s beaut7, f\11 good things 'U,90n his goodness. 
Ever~thing upon earth ref lects the existence of God, and therefore it is 
only the fool ,·1hioh denies him. 4 
It is only with extreme patience thAt A'U..,"11Bt1ne proceeds to prove 
what is moat ~ani f eet in the universe, tho existence of God. This task, 
which i s the t ask of boo},; 2 of the EesaY gn Free Will proceeds from the 
vaguest kind of existence, senee-impreaaion, up a dialectical ladder of 
essences, which proceeds upwards to nUClber, then to beauty and wisclom, 
and finally to God. And the fe.ot of the existence of God oe.n no,,, b:, no 
means be doubted. 
Thie constitutes tne description of the metaphysical background of 
Augustine's proof for the e netence of God. Each is determined b7 their 
two basic motaphysical decisions. !oth proofs arc in a particular eense 
valid. Yet bot proofa differ because of the differing metap~ioal de-
cia1ona upon which they ~est. 
4sele~tione from Medieyal Philosophers, Riobard P. McXeon. editor 
(New York& Charl;;-'°scribner'• Sona, 1929), I, 15. 
OH.APTER IV 
ESS.Ji:N'CE A ID EXI S'l'ENO:si 1N .Ai~UIN'A.S 
The sh~1)e of the definition of God in Aq,ui11&8 am A'1gQ.Stine la de-
termined b;tr t h.a three meta.physical decisions each made. In Aquinas the 
three are: (l) existence precedes eseence, (2) the eaaence ot anything 
is its definiti on , (J) the other kinds of being, relations, exist only 
in reference t o oubetencs, and they exist in Thomae as genus, property, 
or accident. This will exhaust the metaphysical equipment which I will 
use to show the shape of the doctrine of God in Actuinas. 
We began wi t h the proof for the existence of God. N<Tii that ve know 
that God exis t s~ we must discover His essence. But how do we discover 
an essencc1 As I said in section J we do so by means of an intuition 
whic~ i n a aimple, undivi ded act confronts this existent thing. We 
grasp the essence of a dog when ~e see a dog. But we never do see God 
in the ~a.me way t hat we see a dog. We do not aee Him aa a self-moved 
mover, a.a a first cause. We know Him only insofar as He can be known in 
Hie ef"fects. As essence can be known only when the knower directly con-
fronts the axi s -tent. Our confrontation o:r God 1e lndireot. Therefore 
our knowl edge of God is indirect. Therefore we cannot know the eaaence 
of 00d. "Theref ore . a created intellect cannot eee tho esaence of God 
unless God. by His graco ,mites Himself to the created intellect, as an 
obJeot made intelligible to it.,1 !bomae•e firet question will then be 
1The Basic Writing& of Thomas AQuinag, Anton Pegia, editor (Nev 
Torka Random House, 19441. Q.. 12, Art. 4, .! anawer. 
-
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\o consider how He is not. He will have a dieJunotiv~ a7llogiam. GOd 
I 
ia A or :B. ':Che wor ld is A. God ie d lff erent from the world. Theretore 
God is :S. · To know God we can look o.t the existent things we have and 
deduce f r om them \./hat we can know of God, but 1 t "111 be e. kind of nega-
tive kno-.,1ledga. 
liTou ~uinee distinguished between what is known and what can be 
known. God i s not known on earth, but He is caretul to supply an epiate-
molog1oa.l. appare.t u.43 i n uhich tre can sa:y ·that in heaven the blessed can 
see God . Thom~s argues th.at if a created intellect could not sec God, 
it cot'll.d never a t t s.in t o beatitude. :But this is oppoaed to !ai th, tor 
the ult i ro.ete nat'lll'a l goal of the human i ntellect is to see God. 2 
Dut God pr ovides the apparatus for knowing Rim. It existence pre-
cedes es senceo and essence is a definition, then in order to know, there 
must be a f aculty in man capable of appropria ting essences. But essences 
are formal. Renee the fa~ulty which appropriates the essences must be 
f'orinal al so, since nothing which is meterial cA.n appropriate a formal, 
since knowledge is of forms. Thie ts what Thom~& means when, with 
Aristotle , he says t he.t the mind can in a sense become all thinge. It 
has no subetanti.ality of ita own. It ie neutral, blank. Its totality 
ie exhausted in the essences which it contains. Nov since God is -oure 
form (we need not Justify this at this point), he cannot be al)proprie.te4 
by- the· m11terial . Therefore a form!\l f'aeult7 has the potentiality of 
•eeing GOd. Thomas elaborates this point in q. ·12, .Art. 2: The essence 
of' God cannot be seen thrOU&h a Hkeneas. .Art. JI The essence ot God 
-------
2 .!.\!4.. t Q,. 12 t Art. 1, ! !Y!!V!t• 
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can.not be seen with the bOdily ere. Art. 41 The created intellect can-
not by its natural ~owors see the diTine essence. Bllt only the blessed 
aee God, s i nce only the bleoaed are diractl;r confronted o:r GOd and receive 
':I 
light from God • .., Thomas 1s theology is written for men on earth, however, 
and not for the departed bles:<ied. And Ria doctrine of God must be written 
from the point of view of a. pilgrim on earth, since it h ,aoi tten by a 
J 
pilgrim on eax·th; a lthough Thomas was called dootor angelious, he vaa not 
blessed unt i l af t er his theology was written. 
\#hat the n can we know of God, if ve cannot know his euence? Through 
tb:e ef':feots which d@pend ttpl)n a. first cause we "ce.n be led from them ao 
tnr as to know of c;od that He e:dete, and to know of Him Yhat mu.at n9eee-
sar1ly belo~ to Him, as the first oauae of all things, exceeding all 
t hings cauaed by Him. Renee we knov Rio relationship with oreatureso 
that is, He i s t he cs.,1se of all thin«eJ also that crea.turee diff'e:- frol!I 
Rim, inasmuch as He is not in an.'Y way caused by- them; and that His e:t'tecte 
are removed from Him, not by reason of any defect on Hie part, but be-
cause Re auperexeeeds them all."4 This oonstitutea in summtu•y all that 
can be known of GOd by natural reaaon. It ia, in cOffl!)e.rison, vith natural 
theolo8Y in general, a peseimietio outlook on 111BD 1e ability to know God. 
Thomas therefore sa:vs that ffit vae neceesar7 tor man1s aalvation that .. 
there should be a knowledge revealed by God, besides the philosophical 
aciencee reveo:.led by human reason."S Therefore divine revelation is 
3Ibid., Q,. 12, Art S, ! answer. 
4rb14., q,. 12, Art. 12, ! anaver. 
Stbid., Q. l, Art. 1, ! answer. 
l? 
necasaary to make known further truths. For man•a salTation depend.a ,xpon 
the truths a.bout God. Note here again that Aquinaa speaks of truths rather 
than truth. lie apea.ks in this fashion because there is not a single truth 
in heaven i n \1h ich all earthly truth partioipa.tea, but rather that truth 
is the ad.equation of t hought to thing, i.e., a verbal statement vhich 
agrees wit h the facta.6 I t is obvious here that there are many truths. 
It is obvious that f eith means something specific. In this context faith 
means f or Jutuinas simpl y assent to truths about God not known by reason. 
For other theologi ans faith includes a large element of trust and reliance. 
Thoma.a has other t arme to describe these elements. 
Revel ation ou:ppl ements the truths of reason by supplying additional 
truths i n order t o e oropl e te our knowledge about God. This oonsU tutea 
the epis temologi cal 'background. of the doctrine of God in Thomae. Note 
that I revarsed t he order of discussion in Thomae, puttin« hov we knov 
before what we know, which i s the modern way of yhilosophizing. Thomae•a 
epistemology has as a consequence that we oan best know the character and 
strength of t he mind by examining what it ha.a given us in its beat momenta. 
Therefore the what comes before the how. Ontology precede& epistemology. 
In this case Thomas says what would sound ridiauloua to modern ea.rel "Aa 
hitherto \:le have considered God as He ii in Himself, we now go on to con-
sider how lie is in our knowledge, that 11, how He is known by oreaturea.n7 
A mind whose totality is exhausted by its formal contents and haa no 
material part can be known onlJ' ey seek1118 what 1 t does know. I accept 
( 
6 Ibig., Q,. 16, .Art. l, lever. 
7Ibid •• Q.. 12, Art. l, ! !!18Vf£• 
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this as a va l id way. To show hov it ap3>l1ea preo ieely in the tield at 
epistemology would require the scope of another theaie. I therefore 
leave the q,1estion a.t this point. 
Sinoe t·1e, t he i nh.a.bi ta.nts of the ea.:rth, cannot know the essence ot 
God. we proceed by aeelcing wha.t rloes not befit the essence o! God.a 
Al:luinaa goes on i n a serieB of questions to show that. God 1a simple, 
11ince a. f i ro t ca.u.ae cannot be composite. Therefore He 1e not .a body.9 
Nor is He c omposed. 0£ me.tter ~nd form.10 And now• ha.viD& eetabliahed that 
God is a pvxe f. or m, we describe the uniqueness with vhich·ve deal with 
the notion of God es ~ure form. In body there is a diatinction between 
eeeen~e and sup,ositum. N. g., Socrates, the individuated being, is a 
aupp ositum. The essence of Socrates 1a man. In God there is no dis-
tinction bet~f'een nu-9posi tum and. essence, They are identified. The 
essence of God is t he sa.riie as Hie eY.istence, since Ho ie first cause. 
It t hey 1:1ere differ ent, God would be cauaed. In thie reSJ)ect also he 
differs f rom bodioa. Again, he is not con~1ned in a genus, ainoe there 
1s but one Ood. Wor a.re there accidents, since acci~ent1 _occur onl7 in 
ao;uethi ng in wb.ich essence and suppositum are dif'terent. Therefore know-
ledge about God diff ers from knowledge about co1?1posite things in that 
(1) we do not ooek t o pls.ce God in a genus, (2) we do not seek accidents, 
()) ve cannot know his essence or definition. What 1a lettf There are 
four kinds of knowledge' about a thing, We can know the genus, the propert7. 
8Ibid. • Q. J, I.n troduotion. 
9Ibi!!• • Q,. 3~ .Art. 1 1 .! e,swe,r. 
10Ibid •• Q.. 3, Art. 2, ! aDtW8£,• 
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the aooidento the di!ferent1a. We haTe eeen thn.t there areno acoldenta 
in God. There is no genus, since there 1s one God, Ntd for that rea•on 
also there is no differentia~ That leaves property alone. 
:But here a l arge problem arieee. Properties iu coi:tposite things are 
deduced from t he essence of that thing. But we cannot know thn eaaonce 
ot God. And ther0fore the properties of God, if they are to be known, 
must be known i n di ffer ent ways. There are three ways that they can be 
applied t o God. The first are names that are applied to him negatiTely, 
as not composi t e 0 or simple. Second are the ns.mea which describe hie 
relation to hi s creatures, as first cause. What about names appliad to 
God affirmativel y 0 such as good.7 This problem Thomas takes up 1n q. lJ. 
Some have tried t o r educe the positive terms to nogatiTe and relat1Te, 
•a.Ying tha t good 0 f or 0xample0 means the absence of evil in God, or that 
it ref ers t o God. a s the cause of good things in us. Tho111Bs says that we 
means more than t his by good. And so good is predicated directly of God, 
but it ie predicat ed of God only insofar as man can see the good that 
is in God. But this goodneos is aeen· only in effects. And so Tho~ae s~s 
tha.t 11 the aforesaid 1"..a.Jlles signify the divine substance, but in an im-per-
feet manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly," so in the caee 
of goad we mean 11 whatever good we attribute to creatures pre-exists in 
00d, and in a higher way. ttll Such poai ti Te qualities, Aquinas 8~ • apply 
to man and God analogicall7, not univooall7, since the good in man and 
in God are different, not again equivoce.111", since God is the source of 
the good in man. Therefore the good in man is analogoua to the good of 
Uibi5!. • Q. lJ, Art. 2, 1 anaweE,• 
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GOd. Since we know God only thro'Jgh ms effect&, we know His good.neaa 
only through Eis creatures. 
One fur ther point here. Talking about G<>d, and therefore a doctrine 
ot God, is always from the etand~oint of man. God is simple and pure. 
That we apply d i ffer ent names to God E'..nd can make affirmative propositions 
about Him io due -to man ts po.r tial way of looking at Him. The properties 
tha t we know or GOd. t1e know then, in three t1ays, negatively, through His 
1•ela.ti o11 to u s 0 1:?.nd analogically. 
The f irs t section on the doctrine of God treats him negatively. At 
t his point WfJ c ould almos t predict C1n broad outline trhat Thmnas will sq 
abou t Uod. Q;us s 'bioi11s J t o ll deal with the prOporties of God as the7 
exie i. i n God "'in s elf. Such are the negative properties:, s1rnplic1 ty or 
absence of co!upoiai tion, i . e., of body and. of matter; then perfootion. 
or pure a.c t uality
0 
or absence of potentiality; then goodness, which is 
positi ve . i n t ha.t ever y beine is good, but God alone 1s pure goodness; 
then infi nity
0 
sineo God is not finito; then immutabilit7, since God 
does not c iw.ngeg t hen eter nity, because God. is timeless. 
f oll owi ng thie come the properties of God w~ioh belo~ to Him be-
cause of Bis r ela t ion to Hie creatures. Thomas expresses this f irst of 
all in terms of God i n His unity, previo"llS to His discussion of the 
Trinity. Fi r 9 t comes (in question 14 ) a discussion or God's knovledge. 
00d. has knowledge beca.uoe He is immaterial. Knowledge, which Thoma• 
defines in consiotency ~ith his epistemology, which follows from Hie 
metaphysi cs , i s t he appropriation of the esoenoee of things. One's 
capabili t y i ncroases as hie b1material part, the soul, enlarges and hie 
material pa.rt, the ·oody, does not ob.-truct him. Goel 'e knowledge is per-
------------~-~---------------v, 
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feet, einoe He ie purely immaterial. Ood therefora kmowa all. Thie is 
also the a.ne,-,er t o the problem of the rcla.t:\on of the life of God to the 
li:t'e of the crea.tu:i.·es , for in God. t o live is to know, and since Re knows 
all thingn, ell thi~s live in God. 
Go1l ha.r: will al s o, s ineQ will foll.1wa upon intellect. The i ntellect 
existe i11sofar as H kncus, f or it h?.s no cornµonent outside ot its poe-
seuaed knm,ledBe• \\!hen it doea not k11t>\'f, it tends towa.rd aometh in.g. Th.i s 
tendency Thomas ca..lle will. It is 3.lwa.ys a will to\rard good, f'or all 
thing& t end t v\lard the fulfillment of their own natures , which in a (:OOd. 
But God v,llb g ood to Ris creatures also,12 for ootural things have a 
natm•a.l :lncliml.tion to diff,1oe thoir good e.e far as poasible. And so 
00d \-1ills liimoelf to be a nd other things to bai 'but Hims elf as to the end, 
and othe1, t.hinge c.s ordained to tha.,t end. 
1rhe:i.~e is
8 
f u:r·thermora, l ove 1n God, sa~ Thomas, !!_Uoting 1 John 1116& 
God is love, 13 for " love is the first movement of the will run of eTer7 
appoti t ive :pot,cr. This love is dir~ct~d to every existing thin.~. Binoe 
He ma.do H e ~nd i t is therefore good. 
Gcdao c re~tion is called just. calling attention to His willing 
that all t hings have what is proper to the condi t1on of each.
14 
There-
fore justice has oeen called truth, for truth i s for Thoma.a the equation 
of the intellect to the thing; and in Ood the conce!)tion of how things 
12Ioid. , .-i . 19, Art • 2 • l onsl',er. 
13101d. , ~,. 20. Art l , l anslr;tr. 
: 4Ibi d . , <;':,. 21, Art. l, l answer. 
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should be in accord with the way they are. GOd ia alao power, since power 
is actuality, and God is pure act.15 
I will conclude the diacuaeion of the eHence and attributes of God 
in .Aquinas here and proceed to a comparison of the same problem in 
.Augustine. 
l5Ibi<1•, Q. 25, A.rt. 1, ! answer. 
OBAPTER V 
THE DOCTlUUE OF GOD lH AUGUSTIUE 
As i n t he case of Thomas I wish to solve thia problem in A'QgUBtine 
by showing that hi s dootrine of God. in its formal aspect, proceeds ae 
a recognizable consequence of three metap~sical decisions ot v~ng 
priority. The f irs.t is that eseence precedes existence. The second ie 
that an essence is a f ormal relation, The third is that a person 1a a 
congeries of relat ions. 
How on this bnsio will Augu.atine aolve the same problems that Thomas 
eete bef ore him3elf 0 and what form will the doctrine of God take in Augus-
tine? 
First, ,,e do not sea God as the cause of the eftecta which we see, 
for we do not sP.e ensence from existence. \'le see existence through essence. 
tie see t he world t hrough the ill"wnination of the eaaence of God. But 
vha.t ie the esse·nce of God, and how do we come to know it f In Augustina 
the epistemological problem is primary. In Thomae we learn about episte-
mology by exa.r.iining the best samples of what we know. Wey was explained 
previously. Not 80 f or Augustine. It is not poeeible to look at a set 
and, finished product of the mind for Augustine, for there is no such 
thing a s . a determinate essence. There are infinite relations, which the 
mind 1n a constant dialectical proceaa attempts to diaoOYer. 
1taelf is surely shown to be mutable, since it aometimea attempts to 
arriTe at truth and sometimes doe• not attempt to, and. sometimes arr1Tes 
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and sometimes does not. ul There 1a no point along thia path which we can 
take a.a determina te. To discover the nature of minde ve do not look at 
ita product then, but rather at ita function. And this tunction ie dee-
cribed in the dialectical se~rch for knowledce. The parallel to Thomaa'• 
careful reasoning about the nature of God ia the dialectical aearoh tor 
God, as exemplified in the OonfaHian.e and in the dialogues ,2! the Free 
Will,, among other ·. 
A'Ugllstine does not reason from cQncepta and principles to their con-
&eQ.uenoes D as does .'1quinas. He begins with the conaequenoea and d1ac01'ers 
the principles upon which they depend, aca.liJJB a ladder of hlerarohical 
relations until the mind of the Chrietian finds the euence upon which 
the whole world depends. Here there ie no complete separation of faith 
and reason, f or they play O polar pa.rt 1.n the dial9ot10. :Reason is the 
rational procedure , faith the emotional attachment to God, the feeling 
for the pers onal consequences of the rational knowledge. F,acll aff eota 
the other. Kno1:1ledge of the wisdom of God become& !)eraonal in faith' e 
trust in it, which in turn 'QOinta the mind to seek further inatancea of 
the viadom of God. 
Actue.lly nll of the Ohriatian emotions and all o~ the varioue parts 
of thinking ~lay a part in this dialectic. The highest emotional elements 
are :faith, hope, and love, which constitute a kind of tr1n1t7. It would 
be a miatake to aesu~e that A-ugt1Btine usee these vorda oonsiatently in 
the aame wq. for in a dialectical prooeaa of reasoning terms are being 
lselections .from Mediev.i, Philoaopbe}a' Riobard P. McXeon, editor 
(lew Torka Cha.rl-;;-ieribner'a Sona, 1929 • I, 29. · 
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oonatantly tran~formed. However, he does reach one illU!DinaUng level 
in paragraph lJ, book l, of the Soliloqu7s, where he def'inee reaaon aa 
the mi rid• s act of looki ng. Reason plua vision, which is a right am per-
fect act of l ooki ng, i s virtue. Faith is the belief in the thing the mind 
turns to see, which beine seen gives bleaaedneaa. Hope la the Jud.sJnent of 
the mind t hat it will s~e i f it but looka. Oharity, or love, 1s the de-
sire to aee. 2 
Revelati on and r eason also are in dialectical tension. A Scripture 
paeeage informs , t hen becomes more meaningful in the pereonal and reli-
gious part of oxperi ence, which experience in turn provide• a fund of 
truth which wi l l ill u.~!nate other Scripture. 
The !)ath t o tho knowledge of God is thus a single one with polar 
elements r a t hHr than parts. Here reason and faith, the human and the 
divine, are i n t ension, proceed upward to the knowledge of the essence 
and properties of God. 
lli!, Trin.i t~ is the most profound and complete statement of the 
doctrine of God in Augustine. It itself ie written in a dlaleotio, al-
thoUgh not a. dialogue; such a procedure is implied by Augustine'• episte-
mology. 
How do A"Ugtistine•s metaphysical :pre-eupTJOsi tions affect hie state-
ment of the doctrine of God? The statement, first ot all, is provieional 
and never complete. Augustine does not claim to haTe finished hie dia-
ouaaion nor to have attained. The dialectical prooee• is an unending one. 
2ct. Soliloquys, 11!! lioene and Poat-lJ~cen• Father•, Philip Schaff, 
editor (first sariee; New Yorke Charles Sctibnerie Son•, 1917), 111• 
Book l, :paragra:ph l). 
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Man can always only approximate a knowledge of the doctrine ot Ood. In 
fact, hie knowledge shifts and changes from da.v to day and from hour to 
hour. For his life is lived in dialectic. Religion 1B alw&19 a matter 
of knowledge. Prom knowledge proceeds love. :Crom reaaon will. 
Historians or theology ho.ve recognised this and have aet thie a&ainat 
the theology of Aquinas, whom they assert did attempt a complete and final 
statement of the doctrine of God. This is a m1sunderatand1ng of the phil-
osophic me t hod of Thomas. }'or Thomas, althou.?..,b in a different va;r. alao 
'believes t hat the search for the truth about God te.lls short. The state-
ment why they will fall short dif'f ere in Thomas and in Augustine• but the 
conclusion i s the same. The reasons proceed from th~ metaph)'Bica. 
Truth about God ie changeless and eternal. Man's tri1th 1e relative. 
Let me quote McKeon on this point. 
The philosophy of Thomas Aqui nas, then. considers in turn the 
relativity of our truths and the changelese eternal truth of 
which t he discovery of even a tentative truth is indicative. 
We proceed by definitions in which we attempt to express the 
q,uiddi ties of things: then we make J1Jd8menta by compounding 
and d ividing concepts. OUr definitions by genus and difference 
seek to state the real, yet the real ii not constituted ot 
genus and species. Ji'rom the very beginning of knowledge. there-
fore, we are doomed to fall short of absolute truth. The hunt 
for definitions expreseing essence (venare qnod quid eat} is 
never at an end.J 
In Augustine ultimate knowledge ie achieved when all the relation• 
in the universe are contained in a single perception in a single mind. 
'l'his 1a possible only in God. This is a direct oone4tqunce of hie deci-
sion to call relations the essences of the univerae. Knowledge ie of 
essences, and essences a.re of relation,. Total knowledge 1• ,herefore ot 
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all the relations . Dialectic serTea to diecover theae relations. Higher 
relations wi l l contain lower relation,. The law ot inertia, tor example, 
contains t he expressi ons of innumerable occurrenoea within the universe. 
Thia leads Augustine to believe that there ia an ultimate unit7, which 
contains all r elations within it. Thia ia God. ?naotaJt aa man a\t&ina 
a knowledge of these he has attained a knowledge ot God. The taek ot 
knowledge i s also t he task of converaion and salvation, tor man'• beati-
tude is t he s i ght of God. It is oleq.r to aee why Augustine eaya that we 
•see thro~h a gl ass dnrkly. " 
Uow I wi ll use t his material to establish a further point in Augus-
tine. If k nowledge is of relations, then our knowledge of God must be 
of relations . (rher eiore , a discussion of the doctrine of God or 12.!. 
Trinitate in Augus tine will be a dialectical a\tempt to diacOYer the 
primary relations in God and in the uniTerae. 
The lower relatiorui, which are more immediatel7 present to man, de-
pend upon the hi gher . And all depend upon God. To know the higher we 
begin with t he lower . Our material in the emplo)'lllent of the dialectic 
will be sense, reas on, and Scripture. 
The lower relations deal with sensation, the higher with the rational 
elements , t he hi ghest with the ultimate oategoriee of being. The oata-
gories themselves are oongeriea of rela\ione. The procedure in 12!. Trini-
\ate theref ore must necessarily be trom the lover to the higher. 
In actual f act AlJ8ustine can begin on a higher le'lel. And so hie 
beginning is on the second leTel with relation• which are high. These 
are the mathematical relation,. In a dialectic which run• through the 
vb.ole scale, ae that in book 1vo of .Q.a th!, !£.U. Will, the mathematical 
• 
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relations do not come until two--thirda of the dialogue baa been completect..4 
J:ven when the .h i ghest ca tegories are reached, howeTer, we do not leave the 
mathematical r el a tions . .Augustine sayaa 
l3ut when we began t o turn a.bout as if up'iiarda, we to'lllld that 
number s a.ls o transcend our mind.a, and tbat they remain immut-
able in ·~rut h itself' •••• The learned •••• and the scholarl:r, the 
more r emot e they ar e f rom earthly blemiah, the more the:, look 
\lpOn both number and wisdom in truth itself and hold both dear.S 
Mow i ·I; may s eem i mpious to the folk piet7 or many with leseer · or 
greater t ouche s of obscura ntism that God should be discussed in mathemati-
cal terms. Uut h.ernutics has been the criterion of t ruth for many philoao-
phers i n many ages, because it offered the poaaibi~it7 of attaining pre-
oiaion and comprehensiveness. And. for a tneol0gian who ,eea the knowledge 
or vision of God aa the primary end of life, it will be aelf'-underatood. 
th.11.t he \f ill set~k t o employ the most a ophistioated ap:s,aratus hie epie te-
mology can employ . Th~t is ma.thematics for many yhiloaophere. We might 
aa~ here t hat t he key to the understanding of the doctrine of God in 
Augustine is to l earn th~t it is put into mathematical terms. 
A~~stine i s therefore ooncerned with the unity of God.. Be diecueaea 
it in discussing the problem of the incorpore&lity, the eternali,7, and 
the substance of God. 'l'he ttun1t" is the primary torm in the diecueaion 
of 00d, and his f irs t task is to d.iecover the unitary elements of God. 
Therefore, in book 1
1 
chapter 2, he seeks to show that the 1'rin1t:r • 
one GOd • only God = true God. :rolloving this is a c? iaousaion ot the 
probleme regarding the relations of one person in the Trinit7 to the 
4ct. ibid., I, 4?. 
S1b1a., p. 48 • 
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other. The final conclusion will bea the iath--r: the Son• the Hol7 
Ghost. This trill a rise after Augil8 tine baa rQd110ed terms like "glorlt7," 
"sent," "honor, " to mathematical terminology. :E.g. (book l, chapter 4). 
If the Father f~lo:rifies the Son, does th.."l.t mean that the i&ther is greater 
\ban the Son? Or in a:rmbolio terms, is r~ S7 21'0, tor the Hol7 Ghost also 
glorifies the Son. Therefore (in s;vmbolio terme)i 
(F>S) (HG? S) 
-(ll07 S) 
Followi o_,~ this i s the problem of Jesus. What 1a the relation of the 
aervant of t he Lord to God tho Son7 Here a&ain is equali t7. The servant 
of God• God the Son. But this becomes clear onl7 vith the distinction 
in chapter seven between fashion and reality. Onl7 in fashion is he lees, 
for he aJ)pea.red i n humble cireumetnnces, altho\18h he contained the full 
realit7 of his divine nature. 
In book seven Augustine goes into Ohristology in more detail. The 
redemptive a.otiv i ty of Christ too is translated into mathematical termi-
noloa. Man ea.nnot perceive the truth about God and hh condition because 
of the chaos in his life. This occurs thr01J8h the inDDoderate desire• of 
hie physical na.ture. Beca,ise of this ve face two deaths, the death o~ 
the bOdy and the death of the soul. Christ saves ua by his one death. 
Thia one death of Christ saves u.s from our two deaths because ot the 
harmony of one to two. This unites the phyaical and the material, vhioh 
9 Xpreaaea the basic harmony in the uninrse and achievee a oongrui t7, 
eut tableneaa, concord, or consonance. For the 1oul in man dies when Goel 
leaTee it, and the body dies when the soul leaves 11• :But Chriat aa 
Goct with a soul and body d1ea and ie resurrected. 
Thie is the ultiaate 
-
)0 
unit7. Man, !)erce i vi ng thie unit1, can bring his lite into harmony with 
God, for h~ ~oes i n Christ these two relation•, the depelldence ot the aoul 
upon God, and the~ dependence of the body u:pon thP- eoul. Thia 1a the love 
of God, \-1ho wishes e ocd. for man, and good tor man is the life ot harmony. 
The enti r e a t onAmento wit h a definition of the good, is put into mathe-
matical terms . 
Tho 11l 'bimat0 p r obl em of Q! Tr,1n1ta.tt is to discuss the relation be-
tween the t hl•ee person.a of the Trinity. For thia the mathematical sections 
are p i~cpa.z·c,¥t or y . The atonement, for example, :ia described aneral more 
times, er:..ch time i n mor e compreheno1vo terms. In book 7, chapter 4, 
li.Ut~ tine dis t il",~ishos bet~1een eubstnnce and essence. The dietinction 
is bas eel on the :pror ofli tion thfi.t 1 t io ditf'erent tor God. to be and to aub-
s iat. To ouba t t>.nce ,.,<' a ttribute properties e.bsolut6ly, to ea1enoe th.~ae 
:properties ti:1ich we a t t l'ibute relatively, i.e. in relation to another 
something. r .e. , He c:o.n say that God is good ab~olutel1' Ol' in Himaolf'. 
Ue can t a;· that Hio g oodness bears relations to others. Subetance is the 
ultimate uni t y. Under eoaenoe exis~s the highest relationahipa. Thie 
too ia a ma t hema tical statement of the doctrine of God. Regarding the 
subetsnce of God we c11n sa.:r that greatneas • wla~om • goodneas. Rovner, 
theoe three terms, ,1t1ich represent the highest ca\egoriea of being, may 
be attributed r espec t ively to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. 
The eearch f or t he essences of the persons of the 'l'r1nit7 1a an 
endless one, f or the Trinity i s seen in it• traces in the universe, which 
'because 1 t is t.lie orea. ted effect of a ~ini t7, rneals trini ta.rian rela-
ti ons on all levels. The Trinity io seen &I the•• apalogle• are drawn. 
One of the first i s a mathematical one. The Father 1• unit7. Unit7 
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produces form, and tho Son i s the form of the n.ther. A unified tol'JI ia 
order, analogized to the Hol1 Ghost, ,,ho prooeede from the Father and the 
Son.6 A~/7\lstine al s o uses measure, nwaber, and weight to expreea the 
Trinity. 7 Ile spends much time also in the ralatione which exist in the 
h'Ulllan mind , for t he human mind is regarded. a.a the acme of the creatiYe 
activity of God a nd will therefore be oloaeet to the Trinity. He closes 
the book, s t a t i ~ t he difference between this final analogy and the Trinit7 
vith the drawn observa nce tha t we see now through a glaea darkly. 
I h-1ve omitt ed menti on of many crucial question, in Augustine which 
· are necessar y t o ,.mderstand his conception of God. I believe that vba\ 
I have so.id is suf:f'i cient, however, to indicate the manner in which Augue-
tine ' s me t aphys ical principles have determined his statement of the know-
ledge of God . I believe . furthermore, that any orthodox Ohrietian, 
accep ting Au.gu:o t i ne i n his own terms, will find himself in agree11tent with 
Augustine, will :f ind himself thrilled by the vealth of meaning flowing 
out of his t h oue;ht. i3ut 118 may first llo.ve to stifle his preJudice re-
garding the f orm and structure of the presentation. If he withes to 
criticize, he must do ao in terms of the metaphysical pre-auypoeitiou, 
showing t hat there ia some fund.a.mental reason vhJ' the7 cannot contain 
the Christian doctr ine of God. I have 79t to see auch criticiaa which 
could be successfully defended. 
Fire t, however, bef"ore we proceed '" a comparison of Thou• and 
6schatf, .2l2. ill•, book 11, chapter 10, paragraph 17. 
7tb1d., book 11, c~pter 11, paragraph 18. 
.. 
J2 
A'Uc$Ustine, it is necasaary to go back to T'Arymas and to aee what ho haa 
to say on t he Trinit y • 
ORAPT'li'Jl VI 
The problem of God and the problem of the Trinity are more sharply 
d1at1neuiahed i n Thomas than they are in A'a,gustine. ror AngQatine the 
knowledge of t he Trinity nece~sarily preoede• the knowledge of God 1n 
the epistemological sea.le. This is true becauae knowledge can never be 
severed from its dialectical context. The reason for tnia, derived from 
the metaphysical basis, was given in the la.at chapter. In Thomas, how-
ever, the questions can be divided, for the distinction between the per-
sons of t ho 1.rrinity a nd the unity of the divine eHenoe can be made at 
any time i n the discussion. This is in accordance with Thomaa•a eplate-
molo,;y, a 0 d incussed in chapter three. Verbal distinctinctione are 
prim.<.i..ry. Th en c omes ths formulation of the oueetion from word• determi-
nately defined. Than comes the soli.ttion. In Augustine one begins with 
the C?.uestion, then :proceeds to terms and distinctions. In Thomae know-
ledge is a s ~ries of tl"1le propositions. In Augustine it is the percep--
tion of t erms and distinctions. That the same "truth" can be contained 
1n both of these forms will, I hope, become clear in the outline of tbe 
problem of the Tri~ity in Thomas. 
Thomas therefore begins with terminology. He begins vith procession 
in question 27, which 1s defined in terme ot genus and di!ferentia aa 
an intelligible emanation. Then he defines relation in question 28• 
R~lations exist in reality, not merely in thoU&ht. In God relation 
and eaaenoe do not differ in beiu«, for the relaUona are real. Thia 
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too is a definition. Then follows a definition of pereon, vhioh 1• an 
individual r ational substa.nce. A person it a subsistence, i.e., exlata 
in itself ~nd not in another. It 1~ a thing of nat,.ire, for it underlie• 
a common nature, as a s11ppositum underlies an eseeneo of genusi it is a 
hypostaeis, for it also underli~s accidents. This question concl'\idea 
vi th 'I'hornao showing that a. divine !)erson is a relatioa, ror relation la 
the divine essence itself. 
,·ii th this prc?)ara tion Thomae can Ray in quoation JO that there are 
three persons, becalltle an axho.ustive en,:unera.tion 0£ the poaaible oppo-
site relations in God yield two. And two relations means three persona. 
These two a re the ~roceesion of the ~ford and of Love. This ie prepared 
tor already in ~ueation 2.7. 
At this ~oint there enters a short article on the mathematics of 
the Trinity. I to relative unirtrportance f'ollo...,s from the fact that 
number is nothing real for Thomas, as it is for Augustine, but is a 
Bpeoieu of uiscrate quantity. Ae suoh it belongs to a secondar7 genus 
and has no other reality outside of its inherence in a eubatanoe. The 
detailed :problems of numbor in Augus-tine are solved rather in terms of 
the relations of persons. Thomas's mathematics follow,, it ie clear, 
from his dietinction of the category of substances and other categorlea. 
The same problems are therefore solved in different terms. 
Thomas then e oes on to the individual persons. The Father 1e 
principle, the Son word and lJna8e, the Bol7 Ghost Love and Gift. 
It 
la interesting to note tha.t Thomas uses two mwea to oharaoterise the 
Son, Word and Imo.go, while ,1.\uguatino used words and Us variant& onl7. 
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!homaa•s use of word proceeds from hie eplstemoloe7, too 1nYolve4 a prob-
lem to enter at this point. Auguatine'• e~l1temolo«7permlt1 •word" to 
have a more general meaning. Therefore Thomaa 111USt t1n4 another term, 
•image," to · convey t he meaning which Augustine oan conTey in the one 
term "word. 11 
lfow up to t his point Thome has considered each person abaolutel7. 
At this point comes the disouaaion of the persons in reference to the 
divine essence. This prooed'Ul'e is Just the opposite of that which Augus-
tine followed. Thomas begins with the peraons, proceeds to the relationa 
between persona. Such a procedure is neceaaitated by hie me\aph79ic&l 
decisions, whi ch assert that the primar7 aouroe of knowledge is eaaeno•, 
conceived a s a definition, and that relations follow from these defini-
tions. 
\ . 
In A~""'lletine, on the other hand, we begin with relations and 
• 
proceed finally t o a general understam.ing o! person, which ve perceived 
as a con&eries of essences. This is in accordance with Augustine's be.sic 
metaphysical decision also, as outlined in section 2. 
Thomas therefore treats of the relation of person and eeeence in 
question J9, t he relation and person a&ain in ll-0 (not 9eraon and rela-
tion as in question 28), then the notional aots, then equality and like. 
~ach is treated differentl:r from the way that the:, are treated in A~ .. 
tine, for the treatment is in terms of attributes vhioh can be correotl7 
applied to determinative substantives, whose determinateneasea have been 
achieved either thrOU&h definition or reasoning from definition. Thia 
la not to exclude the S0ripture1. \l(e ,av Auguatine making Toluminoua 
use of the Scriptures, and Thomas says quite explioitl7 that ve cannot 
dlacover the truths of the Trinlt1 from ne.tural reason, but llU8t receive 
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them from t he Scriptures . Eis treatise is an atteJ:IJ)t to place the trutha 
of Scriptures in·i0 his met e.:9hysios 1 ..i,n indtspensible step to meaning. 
It shoul<l. be cl ea r at this point how '.i'homas ' s metaph7doal :9rincl-
ples have n.ffec ted his tr~at ment of the Trinity. Th~ general impression 
that we receive is th...iit , genera.Uy speaking, Tho?lll1S treated. of the same 
set of probl ems that A~ustine did, but in dif ferent terms, and also 
that, t::;,"'e ller e.1ly sJ)eelcing, he came to the eame conolusi,.,ns. But this is 
difficult to pArceivc, s ince t he treatMent of the problems in E-aoh instance 
becoees t r ansf or med. To compe.r e. the one in the t erms o! the other, or 
to ooropr~re them both i n H. thi rd set of terms ,.,onld bri~ dintortion.. The 
only a lternative i s t o ner rnit each t o St1E1a1:c in its own terms and to eval-
~ -
UD.te co.ch in those terroo . 
CliAP'IWR VII 
OONOLUSIONS 
1 oan say in a general way that Augustine and Thomaa deal vith tha 
same problems and come to the same concluaiona, but in such a different 
wa-y that it is dif'ficul t to rooognize und to compare them. Actuall7, 
however, there is no :precise way in which I can determine whe~er or 
not they deal 1-11 th the same problem• an~, above all, that the7 expres• 
the sa.,;ie II tru th. 11 For al though truth haa both form and content, it 1a 
impossible to express truth without fol'JIS, and therefore the two oannot 
be separated. It is not possible to take avay the shell and get at the 
kernel. Wha. t it \toulcl mean to ae.e truth vi th out the form in which 1 t 
1s cast is something I cannot even imagine. But it 1a nevertheleaa 
possible tha t two formal presentations of the same body of truth 1118T 
be true, althoup=,h differing in form. I should not aa.v true, but rather 
adequate. Jfar truth can be ascertained onl7 within the form within 
~hich it is expressed. It is therefore impossible to eay thal two 
different forms of the same truth are true. That vould impl)' a higher 
form to whioh they comply. And this io certainl7 an implica\ion I would 
not accept. 
What then is the bade of criticism and comparieon? 1 believe that 
such can be .made after a fashion on the practical ain on the theoretic,al 
level. If the practical consequences of two theories are the 88118 • ve 
may aaaume that the theoretical baaea are in realUJ dnilar, al though 
appearing the same. This may seem like the 1'all&C7 of affirming the 
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consequent. ,A.ncl in most syUo~brae it certa.inl;v would be. But the caee 
of meta.phynics is diffe:t•ent. And while two causes vi thin the universe 
miq produce the oame ei'i'ect, no two basio structure• of a univerae will 
produce the sa.,ile r t'lsul t. Two formal presentations o! that atructure. 
although am;,eerine different, ,..,111 express th9.t basic reality if' their 
conse~uencea ~a the name. The formal presentation of that structure will 
be the closest tha t t·rn can c o1ne to it. This is expressed by saying that 
the basic realit y is an II I k 1~ow not what. 11 
This a.ffo~ds a basis for unity in eoclesiastical. matters. Although 
it is imhea rd. of in ecclesiaatieal circles, it has been a~rongly and in-
telli5ently urged in poli tied controversy. And. I believe the analog 
between the religious and the political holds in this instance. In the 
~olitice.l sphere the practical consequenc~e deal with international lave 
human rights, and governmental structure. In the church the practical 
coneequenaes are the purpose of worship, the moral and religious being 
&nd activity of the Christian, and the operation of the church itself. 
However, practical consequences will dif'f er, and here ori tic hm 
must be made within a system and in terms of a. syotem. In the case of 
Thoma~ we rous·t flhow where he misunderstood Scripture or where he employa 
his terms inconsistently. The same ma:r be said o! A,iauetine, but here 
the task is far zoore difficult, for everything he says is in the co.nten 
Of a dialectic and therefore provisional. 
One may a lso unite on a. theoretical basis, and by this l mean a 
bOdy of Oonfees i ons or a creed, such as the three eowaenioal creeds. 
Since terms are not defined and metaph79ioe not explicit, the statement• 
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are ambiguous. Then it 1s upon this Tery ambiguity that comparieon an4 
1,1lli ty is to be achieved. Both Thomas and A"UgUatine would accept the 
Nicene Creed. The individual words would mean difteren\ thinga. Te\ 
both would read thoir own meanings into the Creed and would accept it. 
i1nall7 their beliefs would not differ to any elgnitioant amount. 
No syntem of thought can be discredited because it happens to be 
cast i n an unp opular meta.physics. This ia not to say that theological 
differences do not exist. Little in the universe ie more obvious than 
that they do. Rut theological differenoes aeem much ereater vhen Tiewed 
from the mounta i n t op of a rival metaphysico. The differences acctuire 
their truo Op !)OSi tion only when seen within the same metaph7sioa. If 
the b od.y of Chris t must be divid.ed. it 011ght at leaet be di'Yided for 
relig i oll.s :reits ons . \·Te should not permit metsph7aico.J. difference• to be 
crucial. Any s et of terms, carflf,1lly used, may convey truth, just as 
any language might. It is impossible to decide between the metaphyaioa 
which Augustine ant.l .Aq_uina.s used through an a priori prinoiple. And 
there a.re s trong probabilities that both are true. And so ve muet 
accept both Th omus and Augustine and listen c.-refully to what they haTe 
to say to us. If the men and women uho profeas Christ today are trul7 
to see the church as their mother and the saints of all a.gee as their 
brothers and sisters, then tlley must not perr.iit meta.physical preJud.icea 
blind them to the words which those who have gone before baTe to a&:, 
them. ilare I end thia thesis with the humble suggestion that other 
Lutherans might benefit much from the vhe and pious sayings of St. 
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